Heidegger Being and Time

ontology 

Being and Time 

Heidegger treats human beings, or more properly Dasein , as essentially characterised in terms of their 'being-in' the world. 

This leads Heidegger to distinguish the sense of 'being-in' that is proper to human being from the 'being-in' that is associated with the sense of physical containment that is part of the modern conception of space identified by Einstein and Jammer and which Heidegger himself char- acterises as 'Cartesian'.

 Failure to make such a distinction would, it seems, commit Heidegger to understanding the relation between the world and Dasein as essentially no different from the relation between, for instance, a box and, say, the apples 'physically contained' within it; it would also seem to entail a view of Dasein as existing in a way essentially no different from the way in which the box, the apples or any other physical objects exist.  Such a view Heidegger rejects as inadequate to any proper understanding of Dasein as such – it is inadequate, in Heidegger's view, because it makes problematic the very possibility of a relation between Dasein and the world or the things within that world and that this is so is clearly evident, according to Heidegger,in the rise of relativistic and sceptical modes of thought. In this respect, the 'objectivism' Heidegger associates with the Car- tesian view of spatiality is seen as necessarily tied to 'subjectivism'  and e this would seem to mirror the connection already noted between the view of space as primarily a feature of the physical universe, and of place, or 'meaningful space', as a human, and, in this respect, a subjec- tive, construct. In distinguishing the spatiality of Dasein from the spatial- ity of objects Heidegger thus asserts the impossibility of any purely 'objective' treatment of Dasein that would treat Dasein as no more than an object among other objects while also rejecting any 'subjectivist' understanding of Dasein in its relation to the world. Indeed, as Dasein is 36 36 In The Fate of Place , Casey titles the chapter that deals with the Heideggerian appropriation of place 'Proceeding to Place by Indirection' – see The Fate of Place , p.  and more generally, pp. –. 37 37 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , ; also Heidegger's Topology of Being , chapter . 38 38 Although, as we shall see later, the notion of containment is more complex than just that associated with physical containment – a point that Heidegger seems, in Being and Time at least, not properly to have appreciated. 39 39 See Charles Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, ) for a detailed analysis of Heidegger's position in relation to the traditional problems of epistemology.  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 23 Pagina 23 properly understood as already inclusive of the world, so one can see how Heidegger could later comment that: ' Dasein names that which should first be experienced, and then properly thought of, as Place [ Ort ].'  Heidegger provides an important example of the way in which the concept of place may be seen as having a central significance in the understanding of human being and so of human thought and experi- ence. mento. Indeed, something like the Heideggerian thinking of Dasein as place is what motivates the inquiry in this book. Of course, one need not, as I indicated in the introduction, look only to Heidegger to find evidence of the way in which place might figure as a central focus for questions concerning human existence – externalist theories of mental content, for instance, provide an obvious example of one way in which environment and location can be understood to be directly implicated in the determination of the very contents of the mind, and I will draw on such ideas in the discussion in later chapters. For the moment, however, I simply want to establish the idea of place in such a way that it can begin to be seen, neither in terms merely of some narrow sense of spatio- temporal location, nor as some sort of subjective construct, but rather as that wherein the sort of being that is characteristically human has its ground. terreno. So far as the idea of experience is concerned (an idea that also appears in the work of many of those writers who advance the sort of 'subjectivist' or 'psychological' approach to place criticised above), I shall argue that understanding the structure and possibility of experi- ence – experience being understood in the quite general and non- empiricist fashion indicated in the introduction – is inseparable from an understanding and appreciation of the concept of place. Of course, the exact nature of the concept of place that is at stake here remains to be clarified. And, while providing such clarification will be the main task of succeeding chapters (it will, moreover, be a task that involves clarifica- tion of the concept of space as well as of place), still the discussion so far has indicated some crucial features that attach to the concept at issue. Fundamental to the idea of place would seem to be the idea of an open and yet bounded realm within which the things of the world can appear and within which events can 'take place'. Such a notion of place is, of course, broader than just the idea of place as a narrowly defined point of location, but this latter idea of place as merely a 'point' would seem to be a very limited and perhaps even derivative use of the 40 40 Heidegger, 'Einleitung Zu: ''Was ist Metaphysik''' (), in Wegmarken , Gesamtausgabe , vol.  (Frankfurt: Klostermann, ), p. .  The obscurity of place -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 24 Pagina 24 concept. Even when we think of a place in very basic terms as just a particularposition – the positionin which I am now located, here on this spot – that idea typically carries with it some idea of the place, the spot, as nevertheless possessed of enough breadth and space so as to allow us to conceive of ourselves, our very bodies, as located in that place, and as permitting us to view the world from it and so, within it, to move ourselves in order to obtain such views. We can, of course, grasp places (even from within the very place so grasped) as having a character and identity of their own. And this is so not only in virtue of the way a particular place allows things to appear within it, but also in terms of the way in which any such place is always itself positioned in relation to other places and provides a certain 'view' of such places. Places are thus internally differentiated and interconnected in terms of the elements that appear within them, while they also interconnect with other places – thus places are juxtaposed and intersect with one another; places also contain places so that one can move inwards to find other places nested within a place as well as move outwards to a more encompassing locale. Some of these features of place and places will become quite important ideas in the ensuing discussion. The 'nesting' of places, for instance, is a significant point of connection between place and memory. Just as Heidegger resists the idea that the 'being-in' of Dasein cannot be reduced to the physical containment of Dasein 'within' space, so the idea of place cannot be reduced to the concept merely of location within physical space nor can place be viewed simply in relation to a system of interchangeable locations associated with objects. This is not to sever place entirely from physical space – in some sense place must 'super- vene' upon physical space, and upon the physical world in general, such that the structure of a particular place will reflect, in part, the structure of the physical region in relation to which that place emerges. The Il relation between place and physical space will, however, be no less complicated, and no more amenable to a reductive analysis, than is the relation between the realm of our everyday talk about our world and physical theory.  Moreover, if place is not to be viewed as a purely 'objective'concept in this sense – a concept to be explicatedby reference 41 41 The rejection of reductive accounts – whether of ordinary language into some 'purer' language of physics, of the richness of place into the mere ordering of spatial location, or of the realm of mental life into the terms of neuropsychology – is a central feature of my account here. Various Varie arguments in favour of the rejection of such reductionism are, in fact, developed in the course of the analysis over the following chapters, although, for the most part, the central focus is on the development of the positive account of place, rather than taking issue, in any detailed fashion, with the full range of alternative accounts.  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 25 Pagina 25 to objects existing in a purely physical space – neither should it be viewed as purely 'subjective'. That place is treated as a largely subjective concept is, as I noted earlier, common to many discussions of place – both those that seek to rehabilitate the concept and those that, even if only implicitly, dismiss it. Yet, although it is certainly the case that place is not constituted independently of subjectivity – just as it is not con- stituted independently of the physical world – neither is it dependent on the existence of an independent subject or subjects. Place is instead that within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself established – place is not founded on subjectivity, but is rather that on which subjectivity is founded. Thus one does not first have a subject that apprehends certain features of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead, the structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place. The Il connection of subjectivity with place indicates, as shall be more clearly evident in succeeding chapters, the need to view subjectivity as tied to agency and embodied spatiality, and therefore as constituted in relation to a structure that extends beyond the subject to encompass a world of objects, events and persons. This structure is determinative, in various ways, of the nature of the subject; it is only within such a place that subjectivity – or, more generally, the structure in which subject and object both appear – is possible. There is no 'appearance' at all within the space of pure extension, but only within the differentiated and unitary structure of place. This latter point applies no less to concepts of the social, or the intersubjective, than to the notions of subjectivity or objectivity – place is the frame within which all three must be located. There is, of course, a common tendency to talk of place, and of space and time, as 'social constructs' (a tendency that derives from the more general use of the idea of 'social construction' within social and cultural theory),  and, e, while such talk often remains obscure whether or not it is place that is at issue, in the present context it is particularly inappropriate. The idea of place encompasses both the idea of the social activities and institutions that are expressed in and through the structure of a particularplace (and which can be seen as partially determinative of that place) and the idea of the physical objects and events in the world (along with the associated causal processes) that constrain, and are sometimes constrained by, those social activities and institutions. There is no doubt that the ordering of a particular place – and the specific way in which a society 42 42 See, for instance, David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, ), p. .  The obscurity of place -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 26 Pagina 26 orders space and time – is not independent of social ordering (inasmuch as it encompasses the social, so place is partially elaborated by means of the social, just as place is also elaborated in relation to orderings deriving from individual subjects and from underlying physical structures). How- How - ever this does not legitimate the claim that place, space or time are merely social constructions.Indeed, the social does not exist prior to place nor is it given expression except in and through place – and through spa- tialised, temporalised ordering – and so it cannot be that out of which, or solely by means of which, place is 'constructed'.  It is within the structure of place that the very possibility of the social arises. In grasping the structure of place that is at issue here what is grasped is an open and interconnected region within which other persons, things, spaces and abstract locations, and even one's self, can appear, be recognised, identified and interacted with.  But in 'grasping' such a region, it is not a matter of the subject grasping something of which the acting, experiencing creature is independent – such a region or place does not simply stand ready for the gaze of some observing subject. Rather, as I have emphasised already, the structure at issue en- compassesthe experiencing creature itself and so the structure of subjec- tivity is given in and through the structure of place. Something similar might be said of the idea of objectivity also – at least inasmuch as the idea of objectivityis understood as referring to that which can be present to a subject, rather than to mere physical existence.  In this respect, the A questo proposito, il idea of the object is itself something established only within a place and thereby in relation to a subject, although, in saying this it must be 43 43 In this respect, neither can the 'social' be seen as having any clear priority over the 'individual' – both arise within the same encompassing structure. 44 44 There are obvious affinities between this idea and the idea of 'the world' that Merleau-Ponty articulates in the Phenomenology of Perception (see especially pp. –) and of which he writes at one point that 'the world is the field of our experience, and . . . . . we are nothing but a view of the world' (ibid., p. ) – the very idea of the world as Merleau-Ponty employs it is, in fact, the idea of just such a topographical structure (a field or region) as that which I have set out here. This should also indicate the extent to which the task undertaken here has a certain 'transcendental' character – it is a matter of undertaking an analysis of the structure in which the very possibility of subjectivity and of objectivity, of experience and self, are grounded. 45 45 Objectivity and subjectivity are, on this account, correlative concepts. And while, generally speaking, one can characterise the 'subjective' as that which derives from the subject or is dependent on features of the subject's position in or experience of the world, and the 'objective' as that which derives from the object alone, this need not imply that either of these terms has a sense that is completely independent of the other. What counts as pertaining to the object and what to the subject is, in fact, dependent on the frame within which a particular inquiry or practice is established. We can thus speak of the 'objective' features of social, or mental life, as well as of the 'objective' features of the physical world. 'Objective' should not, in this respect, be taken to designate exclusively those features of the world as given within a purely physicalist analysis. analisi.  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 27 Pagina 27 remembered that both subject and object are thereby 'placed' within the same structure, rather than one or the other being the underlying ground for that structure. Of course, the existence of some particular place – of some set of objects or of some subject – will be causally dependenton a set of physical processes and structures, but this does not mean that place can be simply reduced to such processes or structures. The language of place, of self and other, of subject and object, describes the world in a way that is tied to the possibility of agency and attitude, and not in terms of physical process alone. And, while the existence of a place may be causally dependent on the existence of certain physical processes, the capacity to describe, experience and understand those processes – for those processes to be grasped through notions of objec- tivity and regularity and even through ideas of process as such – is, in turn, possible only within the framework of place. One might, nevertheless, claim that the account of space and place given within physical theory is more 'objective' than other accounts, and in this respect preferable, in the sense that it treats space and place as existing independently of any subject, whereas on other accounts, including the account already presaged here, in the absence of subjects there can be neither place nor perhaps, in a certain sense, space. Yet the use of 'objective' here is itself one that is already oriented towards a certain priority being accorded to physical accounts over others, whereas whether this is the primary or most important use of 'objec- tive' is, at the very least, contestable. There is, moreover, a signifi- cant difference between an account such as mine that insists on an interdependence between subjectivity and place (inasmuch as the establishment and articulation of place is tied, as will be evident in later chapters, to agency and activity) and accounts that treat place as simply a product of the subjective apprehension of location (and according to which place is essentially a feature of the mental life of subjects). The Il relation between place and the existence of the subject in my account is analogous to that which obtains between truth and the existence of speakers. diffusori. One can say that only if there are speakers can there be such a thing as truth and yet this is not because truth is somehow a 'subjec- tive' notion nor does this demand that we seek a more 'objective' analysis that would do away with this dependence. The dependence of truth on speakers is simply a consequence of the way in which the possibility of truth depends on the existence of language, and, since language and speaking arise together, so there is language only where there are speakers.  The obscurity of place -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 28 Pagina 28 These considerations notwithstanding, one might, however, accept the idea that experience and thought are to be understood as dependent upon the sort of complex structure that I have addressed in terms of the idea of place, and yet query the appropriatenessof such talk of 'place'(or of any related terms) on the grounds that such talk is really nothing more than analogy or metaphor and, as such, is just a stylistic affectation that obscures rather than illuminates. Of course, whether metaphor and analogy are to be treated as mere 'affectations' or whatever, rather than contributing additional content of their own, is a moot point and one that has been much argued in the philosophical literature. There is, moreover, a tendency to assume a clearer distinction between metaphor or analogy and 'literal' uses of language than is actually warranted, especially, as I noted earlier, where spatial and topographical terms are concerned. interessati. Yet, this aside, to assume that space and place are used literally only when employed in relation to the 'objective' language of physics is, once again, already to assume the priority of certain quite particular ways of understanding these terms (including, as I noted above, the notion of objectivity) – whereas not only is such priority questionable, but it can also serve to obscure the conceptual complexity of the terms themselves. The claim that 'place' can remain only a metaphor in this context is simply a reassertion of a particular and fairly narrow view of the nature of place – a reassertion that seems to ill-accord with the complex character of the concept. The insistence on the idea of separating off a metaphorical from literal usage here, and giving priority to the literal over the metaphoric, is also indicative, moreover, of a particular style of philosophical ap- proach – one that sees philosophical inquiry as a search that is generally engaged in reducing complex structures to concatenations of more simple components and in which understanding is primarily a matter of understanding such elementary components in separation from one another rather than from the point of view of the larger structure of which they are part. On this approach, one is right to be suspicious of possible metaphorical usages, since such usages may conceal complex structures better analysed in terms of their simpler and more basic components. componenti. Now I have already noted that it seems to me questionable whetherthe concept of place as I have deployed it here is to be viewed as involving a literal or metaphorical usage – that seems, in fact, to be a fairly fruitless question to pursue. But it does seem that the concept of place that I have begun to set out is one that is already predisposed towards a mode of analysis (if that is the right word) that insists on  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 29 Pagina 29 exploringstructures in their interconnectionrather than by reduction or simplification. Indeed, a characteristic feature of any 'place' of the sort described here is that the elements within it are both evident only within the structure of the place, while that place is itself dependent upon the interconnectedness of the elements within it – as it is also dependent on its interconnection with other places – and, consequently, the idea of place is itself the idea of a structure that must resist any analysis that reduces it to a set of autonomous components. In the introduction, I referred to Marcia Cavell's insistence that the onlyplace inwhich philosophycan beginis ' here ,in themidstof things'.  And, as place itself provides the starting-point for the present inquiry, so the approach adopted is one that looks neither to a subject abstracted from its world nor to a world abstracted from the subject as the 'place' fromwhichtobegin,butrathertothatplaceorlocaleinwhichwealready find ourselves. This place is one in which both subject and object, both self and world, are presentedtogether. Moreover,this place of departure remains determinative of the entire inquiry, since the investigation pursued in these pages is one that aims, not to move us away from this place – as is so often the case in philosophical inquiry – but rather to exploreit and delineate its structure.As I noted earlier, not only does the idea of place provide an important focus for the inquiry into experience, but the idea of place also provides a model for both the style of approach adopted here and the structure of the account that is advanced. Just as the various elements within a place, taken together, give that place its character and identity, and as each of those elements is dependent for its own identity on the structure of the place as such, so the structural elements on which the possibility of experience rests cannot be given any account of independently of the overall structure of which they are a part. The way of approach to the question of the structure and possibility of experience is thus one that cannot seek to reduce the structure to a single underlying element or principle. What Cosa must be done is to exhibit the structure as a whole that is constituted through the interplay of a number of elements. The structure that is at issue here is exemplified – in a form that is especially appropriate given the focus on place – in the relation between topographical features in a landscape or as delineated on a topographical survey map. Indeed, the Infatti, il practice of topographical surveying thus provides a neat analogy and model for the inquiry undertaken in these pages. 46 46 Marcia Cavell, The Psychoanalytic Mind , p. .  The obscurity of place -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 30 Pagina 30 Topographical surveying is, according to an old British Government textbook on the subject, 'the science, artfully executed, of measuring the physical features of the earth and the art, scientifically controlled, of delineating them'.  While the advent of aerial surveying and, more recently, satellite mapping techniques, have wrought great changes in the actual practice of surveying, not only over the last one hundred years, but even over the last forty, the basic principles for the surveyor on the ground have nevertheless remained much the same. In the Nel centuries prior to the twentieth, surveyors relied principally on theodo- lite and chain, on a good eye and hand, and a strong pair of legs. For the Per la surveyor equipped only with such basic equipment, then or now, and faced with a hitherto unmapped region, the task is to map out that region from within the region itself. Only by measurement of distance and angle, by repeated triangulation and traverse, can a picture of the topography of the region be built up. For such a surveyor, there is nowhere outside of the region itself from which an accurate topographi- cal picture can be obtained. It is thus precisely through the surveyor’s active involvement with the landscape that an accurate mapping is made. fatto. A purely topographical understanding of a landscape does not, furthermore, look to some deeper topography that underlies the top- ography made evident through our active engagement within it. There Là is no such 'deeper' topography to be found. The lie of the land is given – almost literally – on its surface rather than being hidden beneath it. If we Se noi take this topographical metaphor seriously as a guide to our analysis here, then we will similarly look to understand the various elements at issue, not in terms of an underlying structure to which they can be reduced, but rather in terms of their own interrelation. (Here it is important to recognise that the metaphor is one whose significance is primarily methodological in that it establishes a framework within whichanalysis can proceed, rather than alone providing any substantive analysis of place as such – for this reason it cannot be construed as prejudicing us towards, for instance, an account of place as just that which is mappable.) When it comes to understanding the structure by which thought, experience, and knowledge are possible, the implication of such a 'topographic' mode of analysis is that the concepts at issue must be understood through their interconnection rather than their reduction, through their interdependence rather than their simplifica- tion. zione. In this respect, Wittgenstein's comments in his lectures on the 47 47 Textbook of Topographical Surveying (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, , th edn), p. .  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 31 Pagina 31 philosophy of mathematics have a special resonance with my project here: 'I am trying to conduct you on tours in a certain country. I will try to show that the philosophical difficulties . . . . . arise because we find ourselves in a strange town and do not know our way about. So we must learn the topography by going from one place in the town to another, and from there to another, and so on. And one must do this so often that one knows one's way, either immediately or pretty soon after looking around a bit, wherever one may be set down.'  The conception of philosophy that is suggested here, and that is given more explicit formulation in my own use of the idea of topography, is something to which I shall return briefly in the concluding section of this book. The complexity of place is mirrored in the complex process of triangulation and traverse by which the topographical surveyor builds up her map of the region being surveyed. No single sighting is sufficient to gain a view of the entire region; multiple sightings are required, and every sighting overlaps, to some extent, with some other sighting. Thus Così the process of topographical surveying is one in which the complex structure of the region is arrived at through crossing and recrossing the surface of the land and through sighting and resighting from one landmark to another. In that process, it may seem as if the region itself is lost sight of – as if it is forgotten in the emphasis on particular views and measurements.In fact, it is only at the end of the process that the view of the region as a whole can emerge in the form of the survey map itself. Both the complexity of process and the apparent disappearance of the region as such in the focus on specific sightings and measurements have their analogues in the project undertaken here. The delineation of place can only be undertaken by a process that encompasses a variety of sightings from a number of conceptual 'landmarks' and that also under- takes a wide-ranging, criss-crossing set of journeys over the landscape at issue – it is only through such journeying, sighting and resighting that place can be understood. In taking place as the crucial notion here – as a structure that encompasses both subjective and objective – it should not be thought 48 48 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics: Cambridge  , ed. Cora Cora Diamond (Hassocks: Harvester, ), p. . In Analysis and Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, ), pp. –, PF Strawson also refers to the idea, which he attributes to Ryle, of philosophy as a form of 'conceptual geography or conceptual mapping or charting'. The idea is not given much development, however, and while Strawson acknowledges that the picture 'has merits', he nevertheless finds it to be 'uncomfortably metaphorical'. Perhaps I am less worried by the threat of metaphor than Strawson, but certainly I think the topographical conception of philosophy I outline here is significant and methodologically instructive.  The obscurity of place -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 32 Pagina 32 that the concept of space is thereby neglected or abandoned. In the Nel Heideggerian analysis that appears in Being and Time , Heidegger's own refusal to countenance the necessary role of spatiality in the structure of Dasein gives rise to insuperable problems in his account. Heidegger’s insistence on the separation of the spatiality proper to Dasein from the spatiality of objects is part of what leads Heidegger, in Being and Time at least, to treat spatiality as always secondary to, and derivative of, temporality. Even the 'existential spatiality' that is proper to Dasein is held to be derivative in this way – so much so that, in Being and Time , Heidegger seems almost to reduce existential spatiality to a form of temporality.  Yet, if 'objective' spatiality alone is inadequate to the understanding of human being-in-the-world so too must any purely temporal conception fall short;  and, indeed, the difficulties to which the Heideggerian analysis of spatiality gives rise undoubtedly contribute to the unfinished character of Being and Time itself. In fact, as has already been made clear, the concept of place cannot be divorced from space, just as space cannotbe divorced from time.  Of Di course, this does not mean that the concept of space can simply be assumed either: unless the re-evaluation and recognition of the signifi- cance of place encompasses a recognition of the connection between space and place, and so includes a re-evaluation of the concept of space itself, all that will result is the replacement of one set of problems with another. un altro. A closer analysis of the concept of space, as well as of the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity, is a central focus for the next chapter. capitolo. Rather than being treated as a simple concept analysable only in terms of some notion of objective physical extension or location, spatiality is shown to be a complex notion involving both subjective and objective aspects. Indeed, the relation between space and place in 49 49 See Being and Time , section , –; see also Heidegger's Topology of Being . The attempt to treat spatiality as secondary in this way is something that Heidegger later rejects (as he makes clear in 'Time and Being', On Time and Being , trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, ), p. ) – in fact, as early as  he already seems to have modified his position (see What is a Thing? , p. ; see also Stuart Elden's discussion of the shift in Heidegger's thinking about space and place in the early Hölderlin in 'Heidegger's Hölderlin and the Importance of Place', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology , forthcoming. 50 50 For criticisms of Heidegger's prioritising of temporality, see Heidegger's Topology of Being and also Maria Villela-Petit, 'Heidegger's Conception of Space', in Christopher Macann (ed.), Critical Heidegger (London: Routledge, ), pp. –. 51 51 In fact, as will be evident in the ensuing discussion, although much of my focus will be on place and spatiality, place itself must be understood as encompassing time and space. On this point see Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift, 'Putting Time in its Place', in Tommy Carlstein, Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift, Timing Space and Spacing Time , vol. , Making Sense of Time (London: Edward Arnold, ), p. –.  Place and experience -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 33 Pagina 33 standard treatments of these notions – according to which place, under- stood as a matter of simple location, is seen as based on space as physical extension – will, to some extent, turn out to be reversed when these notions are understood in any richer sense. If we are to take account of the complexity of spatiality as it arises in relation to a creature's involve- ment in the world, then we must look to a way of thinking about spatiality that sees it as embedded within the larger structure, not of a single space, but of a unitary and encompassing place. Moreover, the Inoltre, la exploration of that larger structure will require an elaboration, not merely of spatiality, but of the interconnection between notions of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity, as well as of notions of agency and causality.  The obscurity of place